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1. INTRODUCTION
The role of the General Manager (´GM) in a …rm has widely been studied in
the business and economic literature (i.e., Galbraith, 1973, and Merz and Sauber,
1995). The academic interest on this subject rests on the pivotal role he/she has
within the organization. One of the key decisions made by the GM, with a critical
impact on the future of the organization, is the design of the …rm’s investment
policy. There are many factors that have a strong in‡uence on that decision, and
one of particular relevance is the managers’ consolidation degree, which determines
the planning horizon of investment decisions. Non-consolidated managers have a
weak position within the …rm and are pressured to obtain short-term results.
Our paper is an attempt to analyze the e¤ects of the manager’s consolidation,
measured through managerial turnover, on one of the most important investment
decisions of the …rm: the labor hiring policy.
The literature on managerial turnover has mainly focused on the factors that
lead to a change in the GM, and less on its e¤ects. Results of this literature show
that the decision to …re a manager is basically connected with three elements.
First, the results he/she has obtained, second, the presence of some external
elements, and third, his/her degree of consolidation within the …rm.
There exists a wide consensus on the importance of results as a performance
measure to evaluate the GM and decide over his/her potential replacement. Au-
das et al. (1999) show the existence of a positive correlation between managerial
turnover in English soccer teams and the (bad) results previous to the GM ’s re-
placement. Fizel and D’Itri (1997) obtain similar results for the US basketball
college competition. Kahnna and Poulsen (1995) prove that managers are …red
in situations of …nancial distress independently of the actions they have taken
in the years previous to the period of distress. Other authors show that this
relationship is not so strong: Hadlock and Lumer (1997) …nd out that manage-
rial turnover from 1933 to 1941 was not sensible to changes in stock prices for
small …rms. These authors suggest the existence of some external factors, which
make managerial turnover only weakly related to either …rm’s results or stock
prices. Among the external factors that in‡uence management replacement, we
…nd takeover activity, proxy …ghts and political factors. We should mention that,
in some occasions, it is bad …rm’s result that triggers a takeover and/or a proxy
…ght, which generates, in turn, a managerial replacement. Thus, some of this
external factors might also be related with …rm’s result. With regard to takeover
activity, Mikkelson and Partch (1997) compare the managerial turnover rate in
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USA during 1984-88 (a period of high takeover activity) and 1989-93 (a period of
low takeover activity). They show that the rate of turnover was higher during the
…rst period than during the second one. Huang and Yen (1996) investigate the ef-
fect of proxy …ghts in Taiwanese …rms during 1984-91. They show the existence of
a higher turnover rate in those situations where proxy …ghts are relevant. Finally,
Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that political factors might explain why the
variation in stock prices is not much related to the GM’s compensation scheme,
especially in publicly-owned …rms. Political pressure to avoid high managerial
rewards seems to have truncated the upper tail of the earning distribution. Thus,
in equilibrium, the managers are “compensated” with some job security.
We abstract from the performance of the GM and the presence of external
factors such as takeovers and consider the importance of the third element: the
GM ’s consolidation degree. This factor is, to some extent, a synthesis of the
previous ones. The results a manager obtains, jointly with the impact of external
factors determine the degree of management consolidation. And, the higher the
latter, the lower the managerial turnover. Thus, Fizel and Louie (1990), Dyl
(1988) and Gómez Mejía et al. (1987) show that organizational performance
does not a¤ect managerial turnover when managers are consolidated (i.e. they
are members or chairs of the board of directors). But, apart from managerial
turnover, the GM ’ degree of consolidation has other important e¤ects. Chevalier
and Ellison (1999) analyze the GMs’ behavior in the …nancial investment industry
and conclude that “young” (less consolidated) GM s tend to be evaluated in a
more severe way than “veteran” ones. This fact promotes the adoption of more
conservatives strategies by less consolidated managers. Palley (1997) argues that
those managers with a short-term contract, non-consolidated managers, have more
incentives to be engaged in short-term projects. Within this setting, it seems
natural to argue that non-consolidated managers may be biased to hire workers
with a short-term contract for the same reasons for which they are biased to invest
in short-term projects. This is, precisely, the main point of the paper. We try
to investigate the e¤ects of the degree of management consolidation, proxied by
managerial turnover, in the …rm’s labor hiring policy. In particular, in the length
of the labor contracts the GM proposes. This will also have e¤ects in labor costs
as well as in the total number of the workers recruited.
We …rst develop a theoretical model of managerial and labor contracting. Man-
agers o¤er workers a short-term contract (one-period length) or a long-term one
(two-period length). In our model, long-term workers use part of their …rst-period
working time improving their skills in some training activities. This decreases
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their productivity in the …rst period, but increases it in the second one. The
point is that a non-consolidated manager has the perception that his/her conti-
nuity will depend on the short-term results he/she achieves, while a consolidated
manager takes for granted his/her continuity. This feature leads the former man-
ager, in comparison to the latter, to contract less long-term workers as they are
more costly in the …rst period, although they generate higher returns in the second
period. Thus, we expect a positive correlation between the degree of manager’s
consolidation and the contract length of newly hired workers.
Two direct consequences of this feature can be extracted. First, there is a
higher worker turnover in …rms with a non-consolidated manager. And second,
…rms with a non-consolidated manager will experience a lower variation in unitary
labor costs. We argue that both consequences should be especially marked in
those …rms with high workers’ productivity, (i.e. R&D-intensive …rms, Clark and
Griliches 1998), as in these …rms the consolidated-manager bias to contract long-
term workers is especially high.
We test empirically this results. To do so, we analyze the managerial turnover
rate in a database of 1.052 Spanish companies, and compare it with the corre-
sponding variation in the number of workers and in unitary labor costs. We …nd
out that the turnover rate has a positive correlation with the variation in the
number of workers, and, a negative one with the variation in unitary labor costs.
We also show, consistently with the theory, that the number of workers hired in
highly-productive …rms is higher when a consolidated manager is in charge.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the theoretical
model. Section 3 describes the empirical analysis whose results are discussed in
Section 4. The conclusions are stated in Section 5.
2. THE MODEL
Description:
We consider two agents: the manager and the workers. Our model comprises
two periods. Initially, a manager wants to develop a two-period project, and hires
in the labor market nL long-term (´LT) workers for two periods, and nS1 short-
term (´ST ) workers for one period. The balance of both magnitudes de…nes the
proportion, s1, of …rst-period ST workers. In the second period, if necessary, an
amount of nS2 of workers is hired. The relationship between n
L and nS2 de…nes the
proportion, s2, of ST workers in the second period.
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We distinguish two types of managers. On one hand, consolidated managers,
who are not …red at the end of the …rst period independently of the …rm’s results.
On the other hand, non-consolidated managers, who can be …red with an ex-ante
probability that takes into consideration the …rm’s …rst-period outcome.
Assumptions
1/ LT workers devote a fraction of their working time to improve their ex-
pertise and become more productive in the second period. Their productivity in
that period is augmented by a K2 > 1 factor. As an outcome of the …rst-period
training, however, LT workers’ productivity during this period is lower than that
of their ST counterparts. Accordingly, LT workers’ productivity is diminished
by a K1 < 1 factor in the …rst period. Thus, assuming a constant returns to
scale technology, the …rst-period production function is Q1 = (nS1 +n
LK1)X , and
the second-period is Q2 = (nS2 + n
LK2)X where X is the per-worker production,
which is assumed to be high enough.
2/ The …rm operates in a monopolistic competitive market with N …rms. The
inverse demand function is pi = ea¡ ¯qi ¡ °Q¡i 1, where Q¡i is the total amount
of production for the non-i …rms and ea ´ a + e" is a stochastic variable with
mean a and an IID white-noise error term e". Obviously ea and Q¡i are exogenous
parameters for …rm i.
3/ The ex-ante probability, pc, for a manager not to be …red at the end
of the …rst period increases with his/her consolidation degree (C). This is a
binary variable: C = 1, if the manager is consolidated, and C = 0 otherwise.
In particular, we assume that pc[C = 0] ´ p < pc[C = 1] ´ 1. And, p largely
depends, among other things, on the accomplishment of a threshold pro…t in the
…rst-period 2. In that case, our assumption of a lower …rst-period LT workers
productivity (K1 < 1) in comparison to ST workers’, ensures that
@p
@s1
´ K > 0.
To simplify, we are going to consider that K is a constant. Thus, we propose a
linear relationship between pc and s1 (i.e. pc = C + (1¡ C)p with p = Ks1 + p0
and K + p
0
< 1).
4/ In the second period, LT workers reservation wage increases because their
1This inverse demand function is an extreme case of an oligopoly with N di¤erentiated
products (Shubik, 1980), where the representative consumer has the following utility function
U = a
PN
i=1 qi ¡ 1N f¯N
PN
i=1 q
2
i + °
PN
i 6=j=1 qiqjg ¡
PN
i=1 piqi where °=¯ is the degree of sub-
stitutability between goods. In case of ¯ = °, and N ! 1, we get in a pure competitive
market.
2Since pro…ts are stochastic (because of the ex-ante uncertainty in the demand intercept ea),
the ex-ante continuation of a non-consolidated manager is a probabilistic feature.
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enhanced skills propel their productivity. As a consequence, their second-period
wage w0, is higher than that of the ST workers in that period (w0 > w). Con-
cerning the …rst period, both types of workers will receive w 3. Consistently, we
also assume that K2 > w
0
w
> 1 to be individually rational for the …rm to hire LT
workers.
5/ The GM’s compensation is a proportion, B, of the …rm’s pro…ts 4.
6/ We consider that LT workers’ contracts are ‡exible enough to allow the en-
trepreneur, in the second period, to use such workers contingently (i.e. fewer hours
than initially established) and pay them accordingly. We refer to this situation
as “labor hoarding” 5.
Time-line of the model
1st periodÃ¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡! 2
nd periodÃ¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡!
1/ 2/ 3/ 4/
1/ A manager with a certain degree of consolidation wants to develop a project.
To do so, he/she hires nL LT workers and nS1 ST workers.
2/ Demand shock ea1 is realized and …rst-period pro…ts are generated. Extinc-
tion of management’s contract depends on the latter pro…ts as well as his/her level
of consolidation. If the manager is consolidated, he/she will not be …red in case
of bad results. If he/she is not, he/she might be …red contingently on the …rst-
period results. If so, a new manager will be hired. First-period disimbursements
are made to both workers and the GM.
3/ In the second period, the manager in charge might wish to hire new ST
workers.
4/ Second-period pro…ts are generated contingent on the realization of the
second-period demand shock ea2, and the corresponding disimbursements are made.
3The LT workers are not penalized with a lower wage in the …rst period. Arguably, their
low productivity is a consequence to devote part of their working time to acquire skills, which,
in principle, have some value for the …rm.
4To consider a management compensation based on a …x part and a variable part, tied to
the …rm’s results, does not change the results of our model.
5For the importance of labor hoarding in US, see the article “To cut or not to cut” (The
Economist 2001). There, it is shown that if not for labor hoarding, the US unemployment rate,
currently at 4,4%, would be as high as 5%.
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3. SOLVING THE MODEL
We proceed by backward induction. Thus, we …rst determine the second-period
workers (nS2 ). Then, we move on to the …rst period where management hires LT
workers (nL) as well as the …rst-period ST workers (nS1 ).
3.1. Second-period Analysis
Management hires the second period workers (nS2 ). To do so, he/she maximizes its
expected second-period utility (EfUman2 g 6), which, according to Assumption 5,
is a proportion of the …rm’s second-period pro…ts, ¼2. The maximization problem
to be solved is:
MaxfnS2 g EfUman2 g = B(Ef¼2g) = B(EfP2 eQ2g ¡ wnS2 ¡ w0nL)
The solution of this problem is 7:
nS2 = N
¤ ¡ nLK2 where N¤ ´ a¡
w
X
bX
and b ´ 2¯ + (N ¡ 1)° (1)
We allow nS2 to be negative. We interpret this situation in terms of some
sort of labor hoarding, as was noted in Assumption 6: The manager uses a lower
amount of LT workers’ hours, and this, in turn, reduces the second-period LT
workers’ costs by ¡nS2w.
3.2. First-period Analysis
In this period, the manager’s decision set (´ Dman), is composed of the total
number of workers in the …rst period (N1) and the proportion of ST workers
(s1) 8. The manager characterizes these magnitudes maximizing his/her ex-ante
expected utility EfUmang 9:
MaxfDmang EfUmang ´ B(EfP1Q1g ¡ (nL + nS1 )w + pcEf¼2g)
6As there is no information acquisition in our model (demand shocks ea are independent),
…rst-period expectations coincide with second-period ones, that is, E1fg = E2fg ´ Efg.
7To derive the equilibrium, we consider that Q¡i;2 = (n¡1)qi;2. Thus, we assume symmetry.
8Note that the proportion of second-period ST workers, s2, can be directly computed making
use of the expression N1(1 ¡ s1) = N2(1 ¡ s2) = nL.
9We assume a unit discount factor.
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Where pc is the ex-ante probability of the manager’s continuation. As noted
above, for a consolidated manager, his/her contract is guaranteed (pc = 1). In
contrast, for non-consolidated managers, this ex-ante probability largely depends
on the proportion of …rst-period ST workers.
Solving the previous problem, we obtain the following result:
Proposition
Under the assumptions of our model, the de…nition of the labor policy for
consolidated managers (C = 1), is as follows:
- If K2 · K1 ´ 1 + w
0
w
¡K1 ; then s1 = s2 = 1 and N1 = N2 ´ N ¤ = a¡
w
X
bX
- If K2 > K1 , then s1 = s2 = 0 , and N1 = N2 > N
¤ . Moreover, there is
some “labor hoarding”.
On the other hand, for non-consolidated managers (C = 0), the equilibrium
outcome is the following:
- If K2 · K0 with K0 > K1, then s1 = s2 = 1; and N1 = N2 ´ N¤.
- If K2 > K0, s1 and s2 decrease with K2 until they reach a zero value. But,
if p < KK1, some …rst-period labor hiring is ensured, s1 > 0, independently of
the magnitude of the K2 value.
Proof
See the Appendix.
It follows from Proposition 1 that s1[C = 0] > s1[C = 1] as well as
s2[C = 0] > s2[C = 1]. Note, for example, that if second-period LT workers
productivity (K2) satis…es K1 < K2 < K0, the non-consolidated manager hires
only ST workers in both periods and the consolidated hires only LT workers.
Finally, note that for values of K2 high enough, there is some labor hoarding 10.
Taking into consideration that w0 > w and Proposition 1, we can word the
following lemma:
10The appearance of the so-called labor hoarding can be justi…ed as follows. When K2 is
su¢ciently high, …rms have incentives to hire only LT workers as they are very productive in
the second-period. The point is, in the …rst-period they are not so productive, (K1 < 1 < K2).
To compensate for this fact, they are hired in a number that comes out to be excessively
high for the second period, given their high productivity in that period. The result is that
those LT workers are not fully employed and, consequently, receive a lower wage in the second
period. In particular, each LT worker has leisure time, l, which is given by the expression
nLlw0 = ¡nS2 w = (nLK2 ¡ N¤)w ) l = ww0 (K2 ¡ 1) (we have used that nL = N¤ for K2 high).
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Lemma 1
The proportion of ST workers hired by a non-consolidated manager in both periods,
is at least as high as that hired by a consolidated manager. As a consequence, the
…rm’s unitary labor costs are lower in the former situation than in the latter,
especially, when K2 is relatively high (K2 > K1).
Proof
Follows directly from Proposition 1.
The driving forces in our model come out as the balance of two opposite ef-
fects linked to the LT labor contracting. First, LT workers contribute with a
K2 > 1 factor to the rise of the second-period …rm’s productivity. Second, there
is a negative e¤ect, as they contribute with a K1 < 1 factor to the reduction in
the …rm’s …rst-period productivity. We have motivated this latter feature by the
time the LT workers have spent in the initial period acquiring some expertise.
However, this negative e¤ect is only relevant for a non-consolidated manager, as
the continuation of the consolidated one is guaranteed. This justi…es the …nd-
ing of a ST labor hiring bias for non-consolidated managers, especially in those
…rms whose activity allows a high rate of growth in their workers’ productivity
(K2 ¡K1 > 1 + w0w ). Firms involved on R&D activities are natural candidates to
experience this type of growth in productivity as they, eventually, devote some
resources to improve the human capital of their workers, a fact that undoubtedly
will increase their productivity (Clark and Griliches, 1998).
Concerning the …rm’s unitary labor costs, the result of Lemma 1 follows di-
rectly from the ST bias of non-consolidated manager as well as from the fact that
ST workers receive the same wage, w, in both periods, while second-period LT
workers wage, w0, is higher than w.
To fully characterize the …rm’s labor policy we proceed to study the variation in
the number of employees. We address this issue by de…ning a variable, jN2 ¡N1j,
which is the absolute variation between the number of second-period workers and
that of the …rst-period. We compare this di¤erence in two scenarios. First, when
the decision is made by a consolidated manager. Second, when it is made by a
non-consolidated one. The result leads to our second lemma.
Lemma 2
The worker variation in non-consolidated manager …rms is, at least, as high as
that in those with consolidated managers. And, this di¤erence is signi…cant in
those cases where there is a high worker productivity (K2 > K0).
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Proof
Follows direct from Proposition 1.
The total number of workers is the same in both periods for consolidated-
manager …rms. But, this is not true for those with non-consolidated managers.
This is related to the ST bias in the labor contracting of these latter …rms. In
general, it is reasonable to expect that the higher the proportion of ST workers,
the higher the workers variation. Interestingly enough, we …nd that this turnover
does not only depend on the managers consolidation degree but on the potential
workers’ productivity improvement (K2 ¡K1). Thus, as recently-appointed man-
agers are, in general, non consolidated, we expect a positive relationship between
manager’s and worker’s turnover, especially for those …rms with high potential
workers’ productivity improvements (i.e. …rms involved in some R&D activities).
We may also derive some conclusions concerning the total number of workers
that each type of manager globally hires in the two periods of our model.
Lemma 3
For low K2 values, i.e. K2 < K1, both types of managers hire the same amount
of workers for both periods. But, for high values of K2 (when K1 < K2 < K0 or
when there is a null ST labor hiring, s1 = 0), the non-consolidated manager hires
less workers in both periods than the consolidated manager does.
Proof
In the appendix.
This result can be explained by the higher probability of continuation of the
consolidated manager. This leads the consolidated manager to value especially
those workers with a LT contract, because he/she can fully bene…t from the
higher second-period productivity of these LT workers. As a consequence, in those
situations where LT contracts are of high value, (when K2 is high), consolidated
managers will hire more workers than non-consolidated managers do. This is
precisely what Lemma 3 states.
Based on the previous lemmas, we may explicitly de…ne the set of hypotheses
to be contrasted in the empirical section:
With relation to Lemma 1, we can investigate the long-term bias in the con-
solidated manager labor hiring by making use of the …rm’s unitary labor costs.
H1: The rate of growth of …rms’ unitary labor costs in the period when a GM
is replaced is lower than in other years. This e¤ect should be stronger for those
…rms that are highly productive (i.e invest heavily on R&D activities).
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With relation to Lemmas 2 and 3, that de…ne the variation in the total number
of workers of those …rms with a consolidated manager and with a non-consolidated
manager, we state the following two hypotheses:
H2: Firms that remove their GM will experience in the following year a higher
variation in the number of workers than in those years with no GM replacement.
This feature should be especially relevant in those R&D-intensive …rms.
H3: For those …rms with a high potential workers’ productivity (i.e. R&D-
intensive …rms), the sum of the workers hired in the period of a GM replacement
and in the following period, is lower than the sum in those periods with no man-
agement replacement.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1. Sources of Data
Once we have developed a model that shows the e¤ect of managerial consolidation
in the …rm’s labor policy, our objective is to test empirically the results of the
model. With this aim, we focus on the Spanish case during the period 1994-98.
To carry out our research we merged data from two databases that complement
each other. The DUNS50000 database provides information on the changes of
the managerial structure of the 50.000 more important Spanish manufacturing
…rms. Thus, this database becomes instrumental to determine the rotation of the
…rm’s manager. We use the managerial turnover as a proxy inversely related to
managerial consolidation within the …rm. We have considered that the manager
who is ultimately responsible of a …rm’s labor policy is the general manager (GM).
When we do not have this information, we will focus on the CEO, and, as a last
alternative, the President. The second database, SABE, provides accounting and
…nancial information for more than 200.000 Spanish …rms.
4.2. De…nition of the Variables
Firms are distributed in 19 sectors including those with high, medium, and low
variation in the number of …rms’ employees, as shown in Table 1 11. After merging
11We should mention that the 19 sectors of our sample are characterized with a code (CNAE),
that has a correspondence with a SIC code which is shown in Table 1. The problem is that this
correspondence is not one-to-one, and our sample of 19 CNAE sectors transforms to a sample
of 16 SIC sectors. As the original data base is organized in CNAE sectors, we have chosen to
11
both databases and …ltering 12 the resulting one, we are left with an incomplete
panel data of 1.054 …rms with 5.270 observations during the period 1994-1998.
We de…ne the following variables:
LABCOST is the ratio of labor expenses to the number of employees.
DLABCOST is the di¤erence between, on the one hand, the sum of LABCOST
in period t and in period t+1, and, on the other hand, the value of LABCOST in
period t-1.
VLABCOST is the ratio of DLABCOST to LABCOST in period t-1 13. With
this variable, we measure the rate of variation of labor cost from period t-1 to the
next two periods.
EMP is the number of …rm’s employees.
DEMP is a variable which is de…ned as the di¤erence, in absolute value, be-
tween the number of employees in period t+1 and in period t.
VEMP is the di¤erence between, on the one hand, the sum of EMP in period
t and in period t+1, and, on the other hand, the value of EMP in period t-1.
This variable measures the variation in the number of …rm’s employees in the
“medium-term” (next two periods).
CHANGE is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 (0) if the GM has (not)
changed from period t-1 to period t.
RD is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 (0) if, in period t, the …rm has
invested in R&D 14 more than the average …rm in its sector. With this variable we
di¤erentiate R&D-intensive …rms (RD=1) from non R&D-intensive ones (RD=0).
And, as we have mentioned above, we use this variable as a proxy to control for
…rm’s productivity.
SALES is the log of …rm’s sales.
ROA (return on asset) is the ratio of …rm’s pro…ts before interest and taxes
to total assets.
DEBT is the log of …rm’s debt.
FINDES is a dummy variable that controls for the existence of situations of
…nancial distress. It is de…ned by making use of the di¤erences in the ratio of
conduct all the empirical analysis following the CNAE sectorial division to avoid imbalances in
our panel data. Throughout the paper, all the codes are referred to the CNAE classi…cation.
12We consider as natural …lters the existence of accounting information in all the years of the
sample, and the non-existence of inconsistent errors like a negative debt account, a negative cash-
‡ow, a negative employment, and/or other negative values in other positive-de…ned accounts.
13That is V LABCOSTt ´ LABCOSTt+LABCOSTt+1¡LABCOSTt¡1LABCOSTt¡1
14We use the R&D expenses to sales ratio as a measure of the …rm’s R&D investments. With
this relative measure, we avoid a size bias.
12
…rm’s pro…ts to interest debt payments. In particular, if this ratio moves from a
value higher than two to a value lower than one at the end of the period, then,
FINDES is equal to 1. In other cases its value is zero.
A remark about the di¤erence between variable VLABCOST and variable
VEMP. We measure the …rm’s changes in labor costs as a rate of variation instead
of a simple variation as we do to account for the changes in …rm’s workers. This
is due to the fact that the worker’s productivity is a more sticky variable than
the number of employees is. Thus, we expect smaller variations in unitary labor
costs in comparison to the variations in the number of employees. This leads to
use intensive variables to widen the former changes.
4.3. Descriptive Analysis
The values of managerial turnover (CHANGE), the rate of variation in labor costs
(VLABCOST), worker turnover (DEMP) and workers variation in the medium
term (VEMP) for the di¤erent sectors of our sample are given in Table 1.
PUT TABLE 1 HERE
On average, we can observe that managerial replacement is 11%, and does not
di¤er too much for R&D-intensive sectors (29 and 31 CNAE sectors) 15. We …nd
that sectors 27, 34, 35 and 41 are those with the highest managerial turnover rate,
and sectors 050, 21, 22, 28 and 36 are those with the lowest. It is remarkable that
in sector 34 (car industry), which is among the former sectors, …rms also show a
higher worker variation in the short-term as well as a lower rate of variation in
the labor cost compared with the mean of the sample. All this relations go in the
direction we expected. But, in general, we can not obtain at a sectorial level a
clear pattern of connection between management replacement, worker turnover,
and rate of variation in the labor costs.
To investigate more closely the linkage between the turnover at the upstream
level and that at the downstream one, we show in Table 2 the di¤erences between
the means of the variables in those periods when the GM is replaced and when
he/she is not. Furthermore, we also di¤erentiate R&D-intensive …rms (RD=1)
from non R&D-intensive (RD=0) ones. We make this distinction, because our
hypotheses establish more clear relationships for the former …rms (RD=1) than
15This contrasts with other countries like the US, where in the former sectors the managerial
turnover is up to 30% (see The Economist, 1999)
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for the latter. Finally, we have also included a variable, EMP, which measures
the number of employees, as an alternative to SALES to account for size e¤ects.
PUT TABLE 2 HERE
The main result shown in Table 2 is that with a 99% con…dence level there is a
greater variation in the number of employees in the year after a GM replacement
in comparison to those years with no managerial change. This result is consistent
with our hypothesis 2. Concerning hypothesis 3, the result is not signi…cant for
R&D-intensive …rms, but, for the general sample the result goes in the opposite
direction than we expected. Finally, the rate of variation in labor costs is con-
sistent with the theory for the general sample, but not for those R&D-intensive
…rms. We will discuss these …ndings in detail in the next section.
The analysis of the control variables shows, …rst, in those years where the GM
has been replaced, …rms’ leverage is superior than in other years. Second, the
higher the return on assets of a …rm, the lower the probability that the manager
is replaced. Finally, from the sales and the employment variables, we can draw
the conclusion that bigger …rms replace their GM more often than smaller ones.
4.4. Econometric Methods
To analyze the previous descriptive evidence in depth, we conduct an econometric
analysis to contrast the previous hypotheses.
4.4.1. H1: Changes in Unitary Labor Costs
To test H1, we propose the following equation. It explains the rate of variation
in the labor costs (VLABCOST) in terms of changes in the GM (CHANGE).
V LABCOSTit = ®1 + ®2CHANGEit + ®3SALESit + ®4ROAit + ®5DEBTit +
®6FINDESit+´i+ªt+"it (2)
We include a set of control variables to disentangle possible spurious e¤ects that
can a¤ect the GM de…nition of the …rm’s labor policy. The SALES variable
attempts to capture size e¤ects which might be relevant (Hassink 1996). The ROA
variable measures the …rm’s returns. This is a necessary control given that in our
model the …rm’s productivity is a very relevant variable. We can also interpret
this variable as a proxy for the manager’s consolidation degree. Consolidation
basically depends on the number of years the manager stays within the …rm,
14
but also on the returns he/she has achieved in those years. The DEBT variable
incorporates issues of …rm’s risk, as well as the presence of …nancing constraints,
which may be relevant in the de…nition of the …rm’s labor policy. We also try
to control for the existence of situations of …nancial distress (FINDES) where we
suspect there are important variations in the number of …rms’ workers as well as
in its labor costs because of …rm’s reorganization following distress. Finally, we
also include, …rm-speci…c e¤ects, ´i, as well as temporal e¤ects ªt.
4.4.2. H2 and H3: Variations in the Number of Workers
To conduct the estimation of the variables that de…ne short-term (DEMP) and
medium-term (VEMP) variations in the number of employees, we propose a set
of equations formally similar to the previous one:
DEMPit = ¯1+¯2CHANGEit+¯3SALESit+¯4ROAit+¯5DEBTit+¯6FINDESit+
´i+ªt+ "
0
it (3)
V EMPit = °1+°2CHANGEit+°3SALESit+°4ROAit+°5DEBTit+°6FINDESit+
´i+ªt+ "
00
it (4)
We estimate the previous three equations using linear regression techniques.
And, in all the estimations, we correct for the existence of some unobserved het-
erogeneity, ´i, that might be correlated with the regressors. The results of the
Hausman Test we conduct con…rm the relevance of that point. This will lead us to
use the panel data structure of our sample to obtain the within group estimators
(…xed-e¤ect estimation).
To sum up, according to our theoretical model, we expect ®2 in equation (2) to
be negative, which would con…rm H1. Moreover, H2 suggests that ¯2 in equation
(3) should be positive. And, H3 would lead to a negative °2.
4.5. Results
Tables 3, 4, and 5 summarize the di¤erent estimations. In the …rst column of each
table, we show the results of the within group estimation of the correspondent
equation for the general sample, while in the second column we restrict the analy-
sis to those R&D-intensive …rms (RD=1). We do not report the cross-sectional
estimations, nor the random-e¤ect panel data estimations, because the Hausman
test reveals the existence of …xed e¤ects, and only the reported within group es-
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timators are consistent 16.Additionally, the use of panel data, allows to extract
the speci…c e¤ect of a change in the …rm’s manager on his/her particular …rm
labor policy. This is the type of comparison that we are interested in given our
theoretical statements, where the comparative statics analysis over some speci…c
structural parameters maintains the other constant.
4.5.1. H1: Changes in the Unit Labor Costs
The estimation of equation (2) leads to the following results:
PUT TABLE 3 HERE
Table 3 shows, for the general sample, that management replacement generates
a lower rate of variation in unitary labor cost in the replacement period. This is no
longer valid for R&D-intensive …rms 17. This result basically shows that a non-
consolidated (recently appointed) manager, restrains from increasing the …rm’s
labor costs more than a consolidated manager does. In our theoretical model,
we have proposed the short-term labor contracting as a possible mechanism that
leads to this outcome.
We also observe that the higher the …rm’s leverage, the higher the rate of
variation in the …rm’s unitary labor costs. Those highly leverage …rms that do
not invest signi…cantly on R&D seem to be the most ine¢cient in terms of labor
cost control. Finally, we have also investigated the e¤ect of ROA. This variable
might create potential endogeneity problems because VLABCOST, includes in its
de…nition labor costs in period t-1. As these costs have a clear impact on period-t
pro…ts, we need to instrument this latter variable. The natural instrument is the
same variable lagged one period (ROA1). The result shows a negative sign for
this variable in both samples. Firms that generate higher returns are also more
e¢cient in the control of unitary labor costs.
16In fact, the correlation between the unobservable heterogeneity (´i ) and the independent
variables (…xed e¤ects) is 35% for equation (3), 45% for equation (4), and 34% for the last
equation.
17We should mention that we have conducted additional estimations, by making use of a
di¤erent criteria to discriminate highly-productive …rms. In particular, we have used the ROA
to de…ne highly-productive …rms. These are those with a ROA higher than the average of the
sector in each given year. With this alternative criteria to that based on …rm’s R&D e¤ort, we
recover, for highly-productive …rms, the negative contribution of the managerial replacement on
the labor cost variation rate. This basically con…rms our Hypothesis 1.
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4.5.2. H2 and H3: Variations in the Number of Workers
The outcome of the estimation of equations (3) and (4) is shown in Tables 4 and
5 respectively:
PUT TABLE 4 HERE
Table 4 shows that in all …rms, but especially in those highly productive (R&D-
intensive) …rms, management replacement has a positive impact on the variation of
the employment. The CHANGE variable contributes positively and signi…cantly
(99%) to the explanation of the DEMP variable. This is, precisely, what H2 states.
With regard to the control variables: The higher …rm’s leverage for R&D-
intensive …rms, the lower the incentives to change the number of employees. We
interpret that these are …nancially-constrained …rms that cannot allow to change
continuously between periods (in the short-term) their number of employees. Fi-
nally, the sales variable shows that bigger …rms (generally more indebted) tend to
change less their workforce between periods 18.
PUT TABLE 5 HERE
Concerning the results of Table 5, we obtain a negative, and signi…cant, sign of
CHANGE for R&D-intensive …rms. This ensures that a recently-appointed GM
in a R&D-intensive …rm hires in the period of replacement and the next one a
lower amount of workers in comparison to those hired in other couple of years by
a consolidated manager. This is no longer true for the non-R&D intensive …rms.
In the analysis of the control variables, we …rst have to mention that, as in
the estimation of equation (2), a potential endogeneity problem with the ROA
variable might appear. Note that DEMP incorporates information of the number
of employees in period t-1, which, arguably, might a¤ect period-t pro…ts. To
overcome this problem, we have chosen as an instrument for ROA the one-period
lagged ROA variable (ROA1).
We …nd, as mentioned above, that big …rms hire more workers than small ones
do, especially if they are R&D-intensive …rms. Moreover, the higher the …rm’s
leverage (eventually connected with the …rm’s size), the more intense the …rm’s
labor hiring policy. In fact, this can be an expression of the asset substitution
problem (Myers, 1977), where the leveraged …rms tend to overinvest. In this case
by increasing aggressively the number of employees.
18Although they increase more their workforce in a two-period basis than smaller …rms (see
the positive sign in Table 5).
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented a theoretical model that establishes a relationship between
the degree of managers consolidation within the …rm and some aspects of his/her
labor hiring policy. Our main result is that non-consolidated managers tend to
hire more short-term workers than their consolidated counterparts. This fact
leads to a lower variation rate in the unitary labor costs in the former situation in
comparison to the latter. A second result is that the variability in the number of
workers is superior when a non-consolidated manager decides the labor policy than
when a consolidated manager does. Both results come out to be especially strong
for highly productive (i.e. R&D-intensive) …rms. And, productive …rms with a
consolidated manager tend to hire, in the medium term, more workers than …rms
with a non-consolidated manager. These theoretical outcomes are empirically
tested by making use of a data sample composed of 1.054 manufacturing Spanish
…rms. The results we have obtained con…rm that, e¤ectively, the less consolidated
the manager, the higher the variability of the …rm’s workforce, the lower the
variation rate of the …rm’s labor costs, and, for highly-productive …rms, the lower
the amount of workers hired in the medium term (the following two periods).
Several extensions are possible. In the theoretical model, we could introduce
aspects related to the manager’s risk aversion, which, in principle, should bias the
results even more in the direction we have pointed out. A non-consolidated risk-
averse manager is going to focus on the short-term results to a greater extend than
a risk-neutral manager does. As a consequence, the short-term workers hired bias
is going to increase. Regarding the empirical work, this could also be extended
by incorporating explicitly issues of workers contract length.
Another aspect worth mentioning the possibility of extending this analysis to
other hierarchical levels within the …rm. Thus, to consider not only the relation-
ship between top managers and workers, but also to take into consideration the
medium-level managers. Other interesting analysis to carry out is to focus on par-
ticular types of …rms like family …rms and compare the results with non-family
ones. We suspect that the e¤ect of managerial turnover on workers variations will
be clearly lower in the former …rms than in the latter. This will be the subject of
future research.
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THEORETICAL APPENDIX
1
We maximize the manager’s utility function Uman1 ´ U :
Maxfs1;N1g EfUg = 19(a¡ ¯q1 ¡ °Q¡1)q1 ¡N1w + pcEf¼2g (A1:1)
S:t: ¼2 = (ea¡ ¯q2 ¡ °Q¡2)q2 ¡ (w0N2(1¡ s2) + wN2s2) (A1:2)
S:t: q2 = N¤2X (by (1)) , q1 = N1F1X and F1 ´ 1¡ (1¡ s1)(1¡K1)
The FOC (we use the fact that once in equilibrium Q¡i = (n¡ 1)qi) leads to:
@U
@N1
= (a¡ bN1F1X)F1X ¡w + pc(1¡ s1)(K2w ¡ w0) = 0 (A1:3)
@U
@s1
= N1f(a¡ bN1F1X)(1¡K1)X ¡ pc(K2w¡w0)g+ @pc@s1Ef¼2g = 0 (A1:4)
b ´ 2¯+(n¡ 1)° and ¼2 = ¯(N¤2X)2+N1(1¡ s1)(K2w¡w0) (A1:5)
From (A1.3) (a¡ bN1F1X) = 1F1X fw¡ pc(1¡ s1)(K2w¡w0)g (A1:6)
@U
@s1
= N1
F1
fw(1¡K1)¡ pc(1¡ F1)(K2w ¡ w0)¡ F1pc(K2w ¡ w0)g+ @pc@s1Ef¼2g =
= (by A1:5) N1
F1
fw(1¡K1)+(K2w¡w0)(F1 @pc@s1 (1¡s1)¡pc)+ F1N1
@pc
@s1
¯(N¤2X)
2g (A1:7)
And from (A1.6) N1 = 1bF1X fa¡ wF1X [1¡ pc(1¡ s1)(K2 ¡ w
0
w
)]g (A1:8)
We distinguish two situations; C = 1 and C = 0.
² C = 1 (pc = 1 ) @pc@s1 = 0):
@U
@s1
= N1
F1
fw(1¡K1)¡ (K2w ¡w0)g = N1wF1 f1 + w
0
w
¡K1 ¡K2g (A1:9)
- For K2 · K1 ´ 1 + w0w ¡K1 ) @U@s1 > 0 ) s1 = 1 (A1:10)
In that case (A1.8) transforms to (F1 = 1) N1 = 20 N2 = N ¤ ´ a¡
w
X
bX
(A1:11)
- For K2 > K1, we have
@U
@s1
< 0 ) s1 = 0 (A1:12)
And by (A1.8) (F1 = K1) N1 = 1bK1X fa¡ wK1X (1¡ p0(K2 ¡ w
0
w
)g > 21N¤ (A1:13)
AsN1 > N¤ ) nS2 = N ¤¡K2N1 < 0 (labor hoarding), then,N1 = N2 (A1:130).
² C = 0 (@pc
@s1
= K)
From (A1.7) @U
@s1
= N1pcw
F1
(1¡K1
pc
+ w
0
w
+ F1K
N1pcw
Ef¼2g ¡K2) (A1:14)
- The equilibrium for s1 = 1 (F1 = 1, pc[s1 = 1] ´ p = p0 +K) is given by:
@U
@s1
= N1wpf (1¡K1)p + w
0
w
+ K
wpN1
¯(N¤2X)
2¡K2g > 0 (A1:15)
Thus, s¤1 = 1 forK2 < K0 =
(1¡K1)
P
+ w
0
w
+¯K
N¤2X2
wp
> K1 (A1:16)
For s1 = 1 (by (A1.11)) N1 = N2 = N¤2 (A1:17)
- On the other hand, for K2 > K0
In that case s¤1 will be an interior solution. Moreover, s
¤
1 decreases with K2. This
19We neglect the constant B in the management retribution.
20By (1) nS2 = N
¤ ¡ nLK2 = N¤ = N2 (s1 = 1)
21By Assumption 1, X is high enough. A threshold to ensure this inequality is that X >
w
a
(1 + 1+k1
k21
)
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can be seen from (A1.7):
@U
@s1
= N1
F1
fw(1¡K1)+(K2w¡w0)(F1K(1¡s1)¡pc)+F1KN1 ¯(N¤2X)2g = 0 (A1:7)
A necessary condition for s¤1 to be an interior solution is pc > F
¤
1K(1¡s¤1) (A1:18)
From (A1.17) @s
¤
1
@K2
= ¡
@2U
@S1@K2
@2U
@(S¤1)2
= ¡N1w=F1
@2U
@(S¤1 )2
(F ¤1K(1¡ s¤1)¡ pc) < 0 (by (A1:18) and
the concavity condition @
2U
@s21
< 0 in s¤1
22).
Regarding @s
¤
2
@K2
= @
@K2
fnS2
N2
g = (by (1)) @
@K2
f1 ¡ N¤1 (1¡s¤1)
N¤¡N¤1 (1¡s¤1)(K2¡1)g < 0. This
follows directly from @
@K2
fN¤1 (1 ¡ s¤1)g > 0 , where we have used @s
¤
1
@K2
< 0 and
@N¤1
@K2
> 0 from (A1.8). This last relationship is ensured when X is high enough 23.
Finally, (A1.7) shows that p
0
< KK1 ) @Ufs1=0g@s1 > 0 ) s¤1 > 0 8K2 (A1:19)
2
If K1 < K2 < K0 ) (by (A1.13) and (A1.17)) N1[C = 1] = N2[C = 1] >
N¤ = N1[C = 0] = N2[C = 0]
If K2 is high and p0 > KK1 (by A1:19), both managers hire only LT workers
(s1 = 0). Thus from (A1.8) and the fact that F1[s1 = 0] = K1 we get
N1[s1 = 0] =
1
bK1X
fa¡ w
K1X
(1¡ p
0
(K2 ¡ w0w )g with @N1@p
0
> 0.
As p
0
´ p[C = 0; s1 = 0] < 1 = pc[C = 1], we can ensure (by A1.13’)
N1[C = 1; s1 = 0] = N2[C = 1; s1 = 0] > N1[C = 0; s1 = 0] = N2[C = 1; s1 = 0]
22A direct inspection of (A1.7) shows that @
2U
@(s¤1)2
< 0
23From (A1.8), a su¢cient threshold is given by pc(1 ¡ s¤1)(K0 ¡ w
0
w ) ´ p2c(1 ¡ s¤1)( (1¡K1)P +
¯K
N¤2 X
2
wp
) > 1
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TABLE 1
SIC CNAE DESCRIPTION Observs
Change
(Mean, %)
Vlabcost
(Mean)
Demp
(Mean)
Vemp
(Mean)
2 013
Agricultural Production
Livestock
9 0 1,28 2,71 40,2
9 050 Hunting and Fishing 65 5,77 1,22 10,29 79,08
20 15 Food Products 1120 10,38 1,17 17,43 171,19
22 17 Textile 55 13,64 1,05 11,73 108,73
22 18 Tailoring and Furs 185 10,13 1,17 10,06 143,97
26 21 Paper Products 245 8,16 1,28 10,05 166,24
27 22
Printing, Publishing
Industries
198 6,33 1,17 7,73 105,28
30 24 Chemistry Industry 805 13,91 5,38 42,37 148,23
30 25
Rubber and Miscellaneous
Plastics Products
357 13,68 1,14 11,97 241,13
32 26
Stone, Clay, Glass, and
Concrete Products
335 10,45 1,25 13,28 162,28
33 27 Primary Metal Industries 130 17,65 1,12 16,46 203,81
34 28
Fabricated Metal Products,
Except Machinery and
Transportation
557 8,31 1,13 10,44 116,43
35 29
Industrial and Commercial
Machinery and Computer
Equipment
410 10,06 1,16 15,81 181,38
36 31
Electronic and Other
Electrical Equipment, and
Components
190 11,84 1,13 22,79 342,27
37 34 Car Industry 260 14,42 1,31 22,80 286,03
37 35 Transportation Equipment 69 14,54 1,15 124,3 454,56
25 36 Furniture and Fixture 140 8,03 1,25 12,59 120,04
49 40
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary
Services
60 12,50 1,37 17,62 247,11
49 41 Water Industry 70 16,07 1,15 22,95 268,74
Mean of the Sample 11,12 1,83 20,39 178,35
21
TABLE 2
Change=1
(General
sample)
Change=0
(General
sample)
t-test
Change=1
(RD=1 )
Change=0
(RD=1)
t-test
Main variables
VLABCOST 1,22 1,91 0,34 (0,73) 1,51 1,18 1,91( 0,06)
DEMP 31,91 15,03 4,21 (0,00) 84,56 18,57 3,15 (0,00)
VEMP 245,18 169,58 2,55 (0,01) 279,98 226,08 0,85 (0,39)
Control
Variables
SALES 13,44 13,13 3,23 (0,00) 13,53 13,35 0,93 (0,35)
ROA 0,07 0,09 4,13 (0,00) 0,04 0,09 3,97 (0,00)
DEBT 13,60 13,15 6,07 (0,00) 14,18 13,65 3,06 (0,00)
EMP 247,24 174,01 3,37 (0,00) 317,27 227,02 1,62 (0,10)
Number of
observations
467 3733 75 577
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TABLE 3
Panel data
estimation
General sample
(t-value)
Panel data
estimation
R&D-intensive firms
(t-value)
Main variables
CHANGE -0,16** -0,09
(1,84) (0,79)
Control variables
SALES 0,03 0,20
(0,06) (1,16)
ROA1 -1,52*** -1,83***
(3,75) (3,46)
DEBT 0,16*** 0,20
(2,20) (1,38)
FINDES -0,01 -0,14
(0,12) (1,54)
Constant -1,16 -1,77***
(0,99) (2,47)
Number of observations 1931 1931
Pseudo R^2 2,69 9,80
F test 3,62 (0,00) 3,11 (0,00)
*** Significant at the 1% level
**   Significant at the 5% level
*     Significant at the 10% level
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TABLE 4
Panel data
estimation
General sample
(t-value)
Panel data
estimation
R&D-intensive firms
(t-value)
Main variables
CHANGE 15,49*** 52,51***
(3,03) (3,21)
Control variables
SALES -6,67** -55,72***
(1,82) (2,48)
ROA 19,78 64,96
(0,71) (0,74)
DEBT -6,13 -36,52**
(1,42) (1,86)
FINDES -1,27 -2,77
(0,24) (0,16)
Constant 181,75*** 1270,19***
(2,59) (3,71)
Number of observations 1931 1931
Pseudo R^2 1,92 14,76
F test 2,57 (0,01) 4,96 (0,00)
*** Significant at the 1% level
**   Significant at the 5% level
*     Significant at the 10% level
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TABLE 5
Panel data
estimation
General sample
(t-value)
Panel data
estimation
R&D-intensive firms
(t-value)
Main variables
CHANGE -9,31 -69,00**
(0,97) (1,90)
Control variables
SALES 12,70** 103,28***
(1,83) (2,40)
ROA1 -36,45 -24,95
(0,80) (0,16)
DEBT 23,14*** 103,28***
(2,86) (2,40)
FINDES 0,64 -4,24
(0,07) (0,11)
Constant -283,71*** -2782,45***
(2,16) (3,70)
Number of observations 1931 1931
Pseudo R^2 1,92 10,94
F test 2,57 (0,00) 3,52 (0,00)
*** Significant at the 1% level
**   Significant at the 5% level
*     Significant at the 10% level
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